This paper reexamines the implications of changing corporate aavings, testing for the presence of a "corporate veil". We argue that previous tests for such s veil have lacked proper focus, identifying influences of corporate saving on private saving that are entirely consistçnt with a complete piercing of the corporate veil.
I. Introduction
The 1986 Tax Reform Act markedly altered the relative tax burdan of corporations and individuala while also changing the incentives for corporate dividend distributions. Over the period 1987-91. corporate tax revenues were projected to rise by 120.3 billion dollars, with individual taxes being reduced by 121.9 billion dollars.1 The act also repealed the 60% exclusion previously afforded capital gains and raised the top marginal tax rate from a high of 20% to a high of 33%. At the same time the top rate on dividends was cut from 50% to 33%.
The shift in after tax income from corporations to individuals combined with the increased tax incentive to pay dividends has led some to predict profound reductions in corporate savings. Since corporate savings typically account for over half of private ssvinge. this has prompted concern chat aggregate capital accumulation will be advereely affected, Indeed, a recent Data Resources Inc. publication predicts that:
"Private Savings are likely to decline because of the massive shift of post tax income from businesses to individuals.., over the 1986-91 interval, personal savings are thus expected to be only $5 billion higher while corporste savings are $24 billion lower. .2 This quote reflects the conception that the transfer of cash from corporations to shareholders vill alter real activity, a view consistent with the impression that shareholders do not "pierce the corporate veil" and recognize the full implications of the transfer. While the belief that transfers from corporations to individuals will have significant real effects may be commonly held, there is very weak supporting evidence for the proposition that pr.t transfer policies have any such effects.
This .paper reexamines the implications of changing corporate savings. We begin with the straightforward proposition that the outcome depends crucially on the consumption behavior of shareholders. If, J4jpg wealth constant, shareholders are perfectly rational and recognize reductions in corporate savings as a change in their own asset position, then they will counteract any changes in corporate retentions with increased personal savings, leaving private savings unchanged. It is this compensating response to wealth-neutral changes in corporate saving that we characterize as 'piercing" the corporate veil. We use this simple observation about shareholder savings to develop a new test for the existence of the corporate veil.
The next section discusses the theory behind the corporate veil and srgues that much of the previous literature lacked a proper focus. There are.
several reasons why changes in corporate saving might be associated with changes in national saving that are entirely consistent with a complete piercing of tha corporate veil. Section III outlines and presents an Euler equation test for the existence of the corporate veil. The test supports the hypothesis that no such veil exists. Although the test's power is-not strong enough to reject certain plausible alternative hypothesis, this finding still cssts doubt on previous results purporting to demonstrate the existence of a corporate veil.
Because the Euler equation test is not powerful enough, by itself, to dispose entirely of the possible existence of a corporate veil, we then consider other approaches to the question. Using a switching regressions eodel of consumption based on the Euler equation, we show in Section IV that the observed significant excess sensitivity of consumption to predictable changes in disposable income is associated with liquidity constraints, rather than myopia or irrational behavior. This is further evidence against the existence of a corporate veil, because such liquidity constraints are almost certain not to apply to consumption supported by corporate wealth. Section V uses recent advances in the theory of cointegrated processes to shed new light on the time series properties of consumption behavior and evaluate subtler tests for the presence of the corporate veil. A significant finding in this section is that the aggregate marginal propensity to consume out of corporate wealth is considerably lower than that from other tangible wealth, This could he associated with a corporate veil, or with marginal consumption propensitiss differing across households according to wealth. Section VI concludes the paper.
Because the previous literature haa often been obscure on this point, it is useful to provide at the outset a precise statement of what a corporate veil would do. Our view is that a corporate veil would exist if a shift in the distribution of an individual's wealth among corporate and noncorporete fonts, holding his overall wealth constant, affected that individual's consumption. We therefore rule out changes in relative asset values that also affect aggregate wealth or the distribution of aggregate wealth among individuals as useful in the search for a corporate veil.
As we shall diacusa, tax-induced changes in corporate behavior can affect individual consumption behavior without a corporate veil: these policies could alter the overall value of private assets or the distribution of wealth among individuals.
IL. The Coroorate Veil
Reductions in corporate savings need not, of course, imply lower aggregate private savings. Corporate savings can be thought of as that investment which is financed out of retained earnings, rather than with new debt or equity. Under certain well specified conditions, this should, as first noted by Modiglieni and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1961) , be of no consequence to the value of the firm. Any increase in dividends can simply be offset by a commensurate increase in the firm's debt or issues of new equity. The Modigliani-Miller analysis will hold in general equilibrium, provided that dividend recipients recognize that their apparent windfall is merely a time reallocation of their asset's dividend stresm. Under perfect markets, consumption will not be altered, because the consumer's optimization problem is unchanged. Real behavior will not be affected by a financial version of musical chairs.
This "dividend irrelevance" view relies upon the shareholder's ability to "pierce the corporate veil", i.e., to recognize wealth neutral changes in financisl policy for what they are. It further requires that shareholders can act to offset corporate savings decisions. If shareholders were liquidity constrained, then an increase in corporate distributions would relax this constraint and increase consumption, even with no change in perceived shareholder wealth. The case is analogous to consumption increasing withcu a change in human wealth if current labor income increases. However, there are two significant differences between the two cases. First, shareholders can sell stock or borrow against it to relax liquidity constraints, while such trianssctions are severely limited with respect to human capital. Second, as we discuss further below, the distribution of share ownership is so concentrated among wealthy individuals that the sggregate importance of liquidity constraints within this group is implausible.
If the value of the fin increases because of some underlying change in fundamentals, then a significant share of the concomitant increase in dividends may be consumed because the wealth or permanent income of the shareholder has increased. If, on the other hand, a firm reduces retained earnings and increases dividends by one dollar without any underlying change in the fin's real prospects, then, according to the permanent income hypothesis, consumption will not change in the absence of taxes because torai wealth remains the same.3 When merkets are perfect, financisl structure, or equivalently, the timing of dividends, should have no effect on real economic behavior. This distinction is crucial to the proper understanding of rhe "corporate veil", snd has been overlooked by much of the previous literature, which seems to interpret consumption responses to fluctuating dividends as evidence of a shareholders inability to see through the corporate veil, To the extent that changes in dividends reflect real changes in the value of the firm, as indeed signalling models would suggest, consumption will, of course, changeThis point lends an interesting perspective to the quote on page one.
There, the shift in post tax income from corporations to individuals, in the aggrsgate very close to a wealth neutral transfer, is predicted to reduce aggregate savings by 19 billion dollars! This view suggests that simply carrying wealth across the corporate threshold induces massive changes in the consumption behavior of shareholders. Since it is implausible that liquidity constraints could explain so large a shift in shareholders' consumption, some other force must be perceived as operating here.
Proponents of this view msy simply believe that some fundamental shareholder irrationslity exists. Alternatively there may be s different experiment being implicitly considered, one that does not preserve the initial distribution of wealth among individuals. Changes in the distribution of wealth could well alter aggregate consumption, but one needs no corporate veil to explain such effects4 A problem one has in interpteting ststerents relating corporate and personal saving is that the experiment being envisioned is not explicitly specified. This vagueness has permeeted the statistical evidence attempting to relate corporate and personal saving, in effect 6 veiling the corporate veil.
The modern empirical study of corporate saving can be traced back to Denison (1958) , who found that private saving was much smoother than its components, suggesting that personal and corporate saving may offset each other, Feldstein (1973) with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution a and a pure rate of time preference 6, then this his optimal consumption path will obey the Euler equation:
where r is the after-tax rate of return to savings. Equation (I) may also be written:
where is a stochastic term with conditional mean zero at time t-l.
Taking logs of both sides of (2), and imposing the approximation that £n(1+x)
x for x small, one obtains
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Since rt and are potentially correlated, it is useful to decompose r into an expected component r uncorrelated with and a "surprise" ten r-r, to obtain an estimable equation8 (4) dc -aS +or+o(c+r
Much recant debate has focused on the observation of Flavin (1981) The notion that liquidity constraints can be significant in explaining consumption out of expected dividends is, as we suggested earlier, difficult to support. Put simply, -y must be very small. Row I of Table 1, Absent liquidity constraints, the coefficient on expected dividends, A2, should be zero unless the corporate veil exists. Since expected changes in dividenda are already included in agents' current inferences about their asset positions, they should not affect consumption. Thia ia true regardleas of the tax treatment of thoae dividends, and whatever the process is that dri.ves dividend changes. The coefficient on dividenda, A2, measures the response of consumption to perceived wealth neutral changes in dividenda. If there is a corporate veil, this will be positive and significant.
As a fidal extension of the Euler equation approach we will further decompose disposable income into components attributable to capital and lahor, keeping dividends separate. This will aid in the interpretation of excess sensitivity aa liquidity constraints in the form of an individual's inability to borrow against future labor income. The equation we estimate is:
Ac a p' + a'r + A1pyle
Tc guard against a possible aggregation induced first order moving average error term, we can estimate this equation using doubly lagged instrumental variables 11
B. The Data
For our estimation we use quarterly and annual data from 1948-85 taken from the Citibase dataset. For consumption, we use aggregate consumption of nondurables and services. Our interest rate variable is the average 6-month Treasury bill rate for the quarter less the inflation rate based on the implicit price deflator for nondurable consumption.12 Income is defined as aggregate disposable income and excludes after-tax dividends when these are included in the Euler equation. After-tax aggregate labor income, capital income and dividends are constructed in a manner similar to that used by Blinder and Deaton (1985) . Variables are converted to real values with the aggregate deflator for nondurable consumption. Every variable but the interest rate is in logs and per capita. Further diacussion of the construction of our variables ia available in the appendix.
C. Results
We review first the results from our quarterly regressions. As a starting point, our eetimation of equatiàn 5 is reported in Table 2 The estimates of equation 6 are reported in the second roy of Table 2 .
We use the same set of instruments but include three lags of dividend changes, starting with the second lag. Again, our estimate of a is insignificantly different from zero. The annual results in Table 3 use the same specification, but are based on instrument sets including once-lagged variables. We include such instruments because some variables are quite hard to predict using instruments lagged at least two years; our test of a corporate veil has little power unless a ressonsble prediction of future dividend changes ia possible)-4
In comparing equstions 5-7 in Table 3 to those in Table 2 , we see few qualitative differences, The coefficients on disposable income sre somewhat higher and those on dividends somewhat lower, but the conclusions are basically the asme.
We have estimated these equations using different measures of the interest rate, different sets of instruments, different deflators. and different measures of consumption. In every case, we obtained results of a similar nature: we have found no evidence that consumption is excessively sensitive to changes in dividends, i.e., no evidence of the existence of the corporate veil. In each case, the error is serially uncorrelated making the standard error estimates used to calculate the reported t-statistics admissible)-5 All of the variables used in the estimation are difference stationary, so no problems of spurious regression are present.
How conclusive crc these results concerning the existence of the corporate veil? The insignificance of the predicted chsnges in dividends is an important finding in light of previous claims to have "proved" the corporate veil's existence. The fact that predicted disposable labor income is consistently highly significant in these regressions while being no easier to predict shows thst the insignificance of dividends is not due simply to the use of poor instruments.1'6
Yet, one must recognize that the results in Tables 2 and 3 are not powerful enough to reject all alternative hypotheses corresponding to the corporate veil. For example, under the alternative hypothesis thst the same fractions of dividend income and labor income accrued to households facing liquidity constraints and hsving a marginal propensity to consume current income of unity, we would expect the coefficient on expected dividends, A2, to equal the frsction of consumption accounted for by such households, A, multiplied by the ratio of dividends to dispossble income. Since this ratio is of the same order of magnitude as the coefficients of predicted dividends, we would be unable to reject the alternative hypothesis. We have already suggested, however, that there are fundamental inconsistencies with an alternative hypothesis based on liquidity constraints. The only plausible alternative must invoke myopia or irrationality to explain excess sensitivity.
Thus, it is important to determine the source of the documented excess sensitivity of conaumption to predictable changes in labor income. Unless a source compatible with the corporate veil is found, the results will support our conclusion against the veil's existence. The results of the parameter estimation are reported in Table 4 . We find clear evidence of multiple regimes. In regime I, the unconstrained regime, our estimate of a is a statistically insignificant .047. The estimate of the coefficient on lagged changes in income is -.023, which is also insignificant.
Sensitivity to the interest rate is slightly higher in the second regime, with a a estimste of .082, but this coefficient is. given its standard error, still insignificantly different from zero. The liquidity constraint estimate for the second regime is .526. The accompanying t-statistic of 6.07 is significant at the .999 level of confidence. These estimates mesh quite well with previous estimates of the model's parameters, suggesting that our alternative nonlinear (because of the interaction of the switching model and the linear consumption model) specification and our simplifying assumptions are reasonable. The estimated transition matrix and the accompanying t-statistics are slso given in Table 4 . Both regimes are significantly persistent. The probability of the economy being in the unconstrained state,
given that it was unconstrained yesterday is .90. The probability of moving from a constrained state to s constrained state is .74. These values imply an unconditional probability of being in the constrained state of only .28.
To gain further insight into the nature of the two regimes, we calculate the conditional inference of the probability that the current year is in the constrained regime. The calculation of these probabilities follows the observation of Hamilton (1987) , that time t information can be combined with our inference about the Marlcov probabilities to construct the heat estimate of However, if we label a year a 'credit crisis year' if the probability of being in the constrained regime is greater than .5, then the first constrained year is 1966, not 1969, with the probability of being in the constrained regime being quite low before that and for sustained periods after 1970 as well.
After 1966, the economy switches periodically from constrained to unconstrained regime. Overall, only 10 years in our sample are in the constrained regime. The outcome of these new tests cannot be inferred directly from the findings to this point. For example, shareholders could understand and compensate for changes in dividend policy while at the same time being more reluctant to raise their consumption to respond to increases in share prices.
This reluctance could be attributable to a lack of faith in efficient markets, for example, a belief thst a market that had risen might be above its "true"
value.
This distinction helps to clarify the alternative poasible sources of a corporate veil. We have already dismissed the idea that shareholders are sfflicted by the "bird-in-the-hand" fallacy, that a dollar distributed by corporations is intrinsically more valuable once in their hands (holding taxes and other real differences constant). However, dividend policy is but one very simple mechanism by which corporate ahare values could change.
Shareholders might be reluctant to respond to other changes in corporate wealth, as just suggested. Alternatively, they might respond as we predict to changes in shareholder wealth, but the change in the market valuation of corporate shares may not accurately reflect "true" changes in corporate values. In either case, a corporate veil could exist, although by focusing on responses to changes in the market value of corporate wealth we do not consider the latter case.
To effect these alternative tests of the impact of corporate wealth on consumption, we take advantage of recent results concerning cointegrated time series.
One implication of the permanent income hypothesis is that, holding interest rates constant, consumption is a constant fraction of wealth. The concept of wealth, of course, is total wealth, and includes the presenc discounted value of returns to human capital, human wealth. According to the theory, there should be an equilibrium relationship between consumption and assets, or, in the terminology of Engle and Granger (1987) , consumption and assets should he cointegrsted.23 The error term froa the equation (9) Ct -p(At + Ht) + at where H is human wealth, should be stationary. Any deviation from the long run equilibrium relationship is stationary and short-lived. If currant income affects consumption, and is itself not stationary, then the error term in equation 9 will not be stationary. Rather, the equilibrium relationship will be of the fore:
i.e., consumption will be cointegrated with assets end income. If interest rates matter, p will change over time, and there need be no cointegrating relationship between consumption and assets.
We examine the relevance of the additional explanation of the corporate veil mentioned at the beginning of this section by estimating consumption functions similar to equations 9 and 10. If wealth is decomposed into its corporate, human, and noncorporate components, then we can relax the assumption that the propensities to consume from these are equal.24
If we difference equation 10 we obtain: reported since no further lags were found to be significant in this specification. With the exception of the coefficients on corporate equities and dividends, the coefficients are all smaller. The large drop in the human wealth coefficient may well reflect the noisiness of our imputation method (see footnote 24). Table 7 presents results for the same model using annual data. These results are quite similar to those based on quarterly data.31 The pure lifecycle model rejects cointegration. and the inclusion of income leads to the acceptance of cointegration.32
The moat startling conclusion in both sets of regressions is that the aggregate marginal consumption out of corporate equities is so close to zero.33'34 As already suggested, this could simply be a reflection of a declining marginal propensity to consume as wealth increases, combined with the high position in the income distribution of shareholders. The distribution of corporate wealth is indeed more skewed than that 0f noncorporate wealth. Row 2 of Table I , again taken from the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, shows the percentage of noncorporate wealth held by different strata of the income diatribution. Contraating this with the distribution of corporate equities depicted in row 1, it is clear that the distribution of noncorporate wealth is more equal, eapecially in the top brackets. Strong evidence of a declining marginal propensity to consume out of asset wealth is supplied in Hoyt (1988) , who shows that differences in the ratio of wealth to permanent income across income claaaea grow dramatically over the life cycle. Hoyt concludes that this indicates a much higher saving propensity among the wealthy. Other evidence of different propensities to consume across the income distribution is supplied in Drobny and Hall (1987) who use a relative tax variable to identify distributional effects in an aggregate consumption function. They find that the marginal propensity to consume is much higher among low rate, i.e., low income, taxpayers.35
Given the existing evidence of differing propensities to consume among income classes, comhinsd with the right skewed distribution of corporate wealth, one may explain the very low observed coefficient on corporate wealth without requiring the presence of a corporate veil, as we have defined it.
This explanation is entirely consistent with our rejection of the corporate veil in section TI. because the previous experiment of altering dividend policy holds constant the distribution of wealth across the population, while the current approach need not. Nevertheless, even without a corporate veil, such a low coefficient could still imply important consumption effects of shifts in the distribution of income away from corporate shareholders.
However such distributional effects have little to do with the separate existence of corporate entities end depend very much on the psrticular policy experiment being envisaged.
V. Conclusion
This paper has used tbe sodern theory of the consumer to devise a new test for the existence of the corporate veil. We find evidence thst consumption is not excessively sensitive to fluctuations in dividends, reconfirming the view that shareholders successfully pierce the corporate veil. This finding is corroborated by other results suggesting that the significant excess sensitivity of current consumption to other forms of incone is due to liquidity constraints which, unlike irrationslity and myopia, csnnot 2R plausibly be associated with consumption from corporste equity wealth.
We find very, little consumption from corporate assets in our consuniption functions. This could be interpreted as evidence for s corporate veil.
However, one may also explain this as representing the presumably very low propensity to consume of shareholders, 77% of whom are in the top 5% of the income distribution. For many purposes, this distincticn could be important.
Future research, perhaps using panel data to isolate differences in propensity to consume from various assets, should examine these distributional issues more closely.
--
Data Mrnendix
The variables used in our analysis are constructed as follows (all veriables not taken froa the Flow of Funds tables are taken from the NIPA section of the Citibase dataset): l)Consumption is personal consumption expenditures on nondurables end services.
2)Disposable income is broken down into its capital and labor components by assigning proprietors' income and personal income taxes to each according to its factor share. Dividends are also converted to after-tax values in this way. Capital income includes interest payments. Labor income also includes wages and salaries, other labor income and transfer payments.
3)Human wealth is the present discounted value of all future labor income (as defined above), and is calculated as a simple univariate forecast of lahor income. This forecast is constructed by first regressing full sample labor income on a constant and a trend, subtracting these, then performing en 8-lag VAR on the detrended series. These VAR coefficients are then used to forecast labor income given period t information, then the constant and trend are added back in, 4)Corporate wealth is item 26 of the FOF sector balance sheets for households.
As there is a separate entry for pension fund reserves (item 30), our variable excludes equities held by pension funds. Such pension assets are included in our measure of noncorporate wealth.
5)Noncorporate wealth is also taken from the FOF sector balance sheets for households. It equals owner occupied housing (item 4) plus total financial assets (item 11). less corporate equities (item 26) and total liabilities ret of installment consumer credit (item 35 minus item 40). We exclude installment consumer credit and consumer durables for consistency with our 28 consumption definition, which excludes durables.
6)The interest rates used are quarterly averages of the 6-month and 3-month treasury bill rates. September, 1986. p. 17. 3tven with dividend taxes present, consumption should chsnge only to the extent that the dividend payment reduces the shareholdera wealth. This effect should be smsll, and under the "new view" of corporate equity valuation (Aucrbach 1979) should be nonexistent. In any event, since the teats derived below examine the effects on consumption of changes in dividend policy, holding wealth constant, any effects on wealth of pure financial policy associated with taxes will be purged from the estimated consumption response.
4Another possible channel for increased consumption effects would be wealth induced changes associated with the shift in the tax burden. While there is a plausible theoretical argument that the provisions of the 1986 Act should have increased the value of corporate shares (Auerbach, 1989) , this does not seem to be the mechanism the authors hsve in mind. However, this ambiguity highlights the problem in identifying the source of the perceived impact on consumption.
5For further evidence of the existence of the corporate veil see Shatia (1979), or Hendershott and Peek (1987) . For recent evidence against the corporate veil eec von Furstenburg (1981) .
6lndeed, corporate savings is extremely difficult to define. For example, an increase in share repurchases and reduction in dividends appears ss an increase in corporate savings and a concomitant decline in personal savings.
7See Phillips (1986) for a recent discussion of spurious regressions.
8several issues arise in considering whether it is acceptable to apply such 20The interest rate used is the annual average of quarterly 3-month T-bill rates.
21For example, the unconditional probability of being in state I is:
p21/(p12-ep2l). See Ohiang for more details.
22the differential reported is the average rate on short term commercial loans minus the prime rate taken from the Federal Reserve aulletin. We were unable to ohtain a full series of another alternative measure of credit tightness attributable to Jaffee (1971) .
We interpret the relatively low differential during the 1960s credit crisis as reflective of the well known quantity rationing in lending markets which occurred at that time, most notable the credit crunch of 1966. in an alternative specification, which interacted the differential with income in an Euler equation, we found that the interaction term had the correct sign but was not significantly different from zero. This is perhaps a reflection of the noisiness of the measure during the l9tOs.
23This assumes, of course, that they are both the same order of integrstion
All of the variables we use are integrated of the first order, or 1(1).
24since equations 6 and 7 also hold in differencee, one might also make inferences about the relative speeds of adjustment to changes in different forms of wealth by comparing the estimates from the levels regressions to those using differences. Since differencing is equivalent to passing the data through a filter which gives little weight to the low frequencies in the data, one would interpret the differenced estimates as "short run" coefficients and the levels estimates as the long run coefficients. However, given the errors with which noncorporate assets and, especially, human wealth are computed, one would also expect differences to depress the coefficients of the variables. 33This result is consistent with earlier findings. Bean (1987) repcrts similarly small estimates of the impact of corporate wealth on consumption. Blinder and Deaton (1985) report only en eatintate based on total net worth as a measure of wealth. Their estimate is approximately equal to our estimated coefficient for noncorporate wealth. In an alternative specification (not reported) that excluded human wealth, we obtained a slightly higher coefficient (.015) for corporate wealth, but interpret this simply as evidence that the stock market is useful in predicting future labor income.
34one potential explanation of this result is that the induced relationship between owner-occupied housing and the imputed rent on such housing raises the coefficient on noncotporate assets above its true value. Leaving these two variables out of aaaets end consumption. respectively, actually leads to an increase in the gap between the two coefficients on assets. In equation (3) the coefficient on corporate wealth goes from .009 to .010 and that on noncorporate wealth rises from .039 to .058.
35Additional evidence on the effects of income redistribution on aggregate consumption is supplied in Borooah and Sharpe (1986) . Notes: All variables, except the real interest race, expressed as differences of the logs of population-deflated variables. -.03 
